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Abstract
The paper discusses a methodology for design and pricing of index insurance
contracts for crop production. The methodology heavily relies on establishing
a relationship between the index and yields in order to evaluate the contract
performance in hedging farmers’ risk. However, analysis of yield/rainfall data
series for Iowa corn and Kansas wheat fail to produce a reliable and meaningful
relationship which can be used uniformly across several counties and/or crop
producing districts. Further research is needed as to applicability of rainfall
insurance to speciﬁc crop/region combinations.
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Introduction
Agricultural production has always been a risky endeavor. Farmers constantly
have to deal with unfavorable weather conditions, variability in prices of inputs and
outputs, livestock disease outbreaks, pests, etc. The uncertainty of future incomes
complicates both short-term production decisions and long-term planning (e.g. ex-
pansion of production or capital investments in machinery and equipment). It also
renders lending institutions less willing to provide loans to farmers, since the prob-
ability of default is relatively high. Although some forms of self-insurance may be
available to farmers (e.g. crop diversiﬁcation or intertemporal income transfers), these
have certain limitations and ultimately reduce farm proﬁts in the long term.
Of all the risk factors aﬀecting agricultural production, especially crop production,
weather is typically the most signiﬁcant. Weather phenomena are hard to predict (at
least in the beginning of the growing season) and even harder to mitigate against.
Moreover, since unfavorable weather conditions such as ﬂoods or droughts often aﬀect
large areas, the risks faced by diﬀerent producers are correlated. The latter presents
a stumbling block to traditional insurance, which is designed to pool a large number
of small unrelated risks rather than handle widespread simultaneous (catastrophic)
losses.
In a perfect world, risk sharing would be complete and the cost of ceding would
be close to the actuarially-fair rate. High levels of catastrophe risk retention by
retail insurance and high reinsurance rates are evidence of incomplete or imperfect
markets. Applied to crop insurance, market imperfection translates into unacceptably
high rates or even complete lack of risk protection for farmers.
1Traditionally, unwillingness or inability of insurance markets to provide risk man-
agement mechanisms for agricultural crop production has prompted many govern-
ments to step in with various forms of support of agricultural producers (subsidized
loans, price-support programs, etc.). Unfortunately, the government support pro-
grams are often ineﬃcient and come at high social cost (Skees, Hazell, and Miranda).
An emerging trend in recent years has been to develop new ﬁnancial instruments
(catastrophe options, catastrophe bonds) which would allow insurers to securitize
correlated risks and circumvent the limitations of traditional insurance market. In
application to agricultural insurance, the innovations include area-yield insurance
program and various exchange-traded area-yield contracts. A characteristic feature
of these instruments is that their payoﬀ depends on values of a specially designed
measure, or index, related to the risk being hedged against.
The main advantage of indices is that they can be measured objectively and do
not depend on individual actions of market participants. Transparency of index-
based contracts along with the fact that they are uncorrelated with the traditional
ﬁnancial instruments (stocks, bonds, etc.) make them attractive to investors outside
of insurance industry. Insurers beneﬁt by getting access to additional funds that can
be used to indemnify large simultaneous losses caused by natural disasters.
In the same way, using index-based instruments in agricultural risk management
(e.g. rainfall insurance, heating degree-days contracts, area-yield contracts, etc.)
allows to circumvent problems faced by traditional insurance and provide farmers
with an eﬃcient hedge of weather-related risks. However, a design of an index-
based insurance contract or ﬁnancial instrument requires answering very important
questions, such as what variable to use as an index, how to structure the indemnity
schedule, how to price a contract, how to sell it, and whom to sell it to.
2General Approach to Design and Pricing of Index Contracts
In order to create an eﬃcient index insurance contract for agricultural crop pro-
duction, the following principles should be adhered to. First, the contract should
have a relatively simple and transparent structure. An individual buying the con-
tract should not be confused as to when and under what circumstances the contract
will pay oﬀ.
Second, the index should be easily observable and measurable on a regular basis.
Further, there should be enough historical observations of the index in order to derive
its distribution and relation to the actual risk being insured.
Third, using an index to compute indemnities rather than actual losses inevitably
introduces some basis risk. Therefore, careful consideration should be given as to
what variable (or combination of variables) to use as an index in order to minimize
the basis risk to the extent possible.
Fourth, given the traditional accounting practices of insurance companies, the
premium rate and the risk exposure borne by the company issuing the contract should
be clear.
While an index contract may be structured in many diﬀerent ways with diﬀer-
ent coverage layers and provisions, we will focus our attention on a speciﬁc class of
elementary contract. Speciﬁcally, an elementary contract pays an indemnity f(  ι)
conditional on realization of the index   ι according to the following schedule (ﬁgure 1)
f(  ι)=

      
      
x, if   ι ≤ λi∗;
x
i∗ −   ι
(1 − λ)i∗, if λi∗ <   ι ≤ i∗;
0, if i∗ <   ι,
(1)
3In other words, the contract pays whenever the index   ι falls below a speciﬁed trigger
i∗, with the indemnity proportional to the diﬀerence between the index and the
trigger. The maximum indemnity $x is paid whenever the index falls below a critical
value λi∗,0≤ λ ≤ 1.
Although developed independently, this setup is somewhat similar to that used
by Martin, Barnett, and Cobble. The main diﬀerences are that we emphasize the
insurance aspect of the contract and specify the payment structure so that indemnities
are paid for rain deﬁciency rather than excess rainfall. This approach seems to be
more suitable for crop production where drought negatively aﬀects the harvest-time
yield.
Elementary contracts in (1) are convenient for analysis, yet oﬀer enough ﬂexibility
to construct more complicated instruments. Combining elementary contracts with
diﬀerent triggers i∗, limit parameters λ, and maximum liabilities x, one can recreate
or otherwise approximate more complicated, multi-layered indemniﬁcation schedules
that may provide eﬃcient risk protection whenever expected losses are not linearly
related to index. The elementary contract also contains the simple “all-or-nothing”
contract as a special case. Speciﬁcally, when λ = 1, the contract pays the maximum
indemnity if the index falls below the trigger level i∗, but pays nothing otherwise.
In order to specify a particular contract, we need to impose three conditions
on the contract parameters i∗, λ,a n dx. These conditions can be chosen so that
the contract has pre-speciﬁed properties. For the purposes of our analysis, it will
be convenient to further standardize the contracts under consideration by requiring
them all to have an expected indemnity, or pure premium, of $1. From the buyer’s
standpoint this is a convenient normalization, since it allows him to see readily how
much protection he can buy for $1 in pure premium by inspecting the indemnity
4schedule. The normalization, however, is not restrictive, since one can achieve any
coverage level desired simply by buy the necessary number of $1 contracts.
We shall refer to an elementary contract with a pure premium of $1 as a standard
contract. For the standard contract, the parameters must be chosen so that
1=E  ι f(  ι;i
∗,λ,x)=x









where h(i) is the probability density function of the index   ι.
Insurance companies usually design contracts based on a premium rate, which is
the ratio between the premium and largest risk on line. Because a standard contract





where x is the maximum liability. In other words, ﬁxing the premium rate of a
standard contract immediately ﬁxes its maximum liability.
Thus, a standard contract can be uniquely identiﬁed by its premium rate π and
limit parameter λ. Condition (3) ﬁxes the maximum liability x given the premium
rate, and condition (2) implicitly ﬁxes the trigger i∗ given the limit parameter λ.
One of our goals is to develop a systematic approach to designing standard index
contracts that are optimal, in some sense, for potential buyers. Let us look at the
standard index contract from a buyer’s standpoint. Assume that the individual’s
income   r subject to an index-related risk can be expressed as a function g of the
index   ι and an independent random shock ε
  r = g(  ι;ε), (4)
5where ε essentially represents the basis risk.
In case of agricultural insurance, we assume that the buyer is a farmer involved
in agricultural production, i.e. growing crops. The farmer’s income, or net revenue
  r can be calculated as   r =   p ·   y − c,w h e r e  p is the harvest time price,   y is the crop
yield, and c is the total production cost. Depending on the particular situation, the
risk faced by the farmer may be caused by either uncertainty about yields or prices.
Further, assume that the individual has some target income level r∗ he wishes to
protect. The target income may be some fraction (e.g. 75%) of the expected income
r = Eg(  ι;ε) or some other income level (e.g. the level at which the individual breaks
even). Income lower than the target is considered to be a loss
  L =m a x {0,r
∗ − g(  ι;ε)}.
If the individual buys N standard contracts deﬁned by the parameters π and λ and
conditions (2) and (3), his total loss with contracts is then
  Lc =m a x{0,r
∗ − [g(  ι;ε)+Nf(  ι;π,λ) − N]}.
We assume that the individual tries to avoid the downside loss at all states of nature
and therefore wants to minimize his total expected root-mean square (RMS) loss.
Hence, the optimal number N∗ of standard contracts as well as the optimal parameters
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Given the above considerations, the process of designing and pricing of a standard
6index contract for a representative buyer can be outlined as follows.
First, given the distribution of the underlying index   ι and relation between the
index and buyer’s risk exposure   L (determined by the function g and the target
income level r∗), the optimal number N∗ of standard contracts and the contract
parameters are determined by solving (5). The buyer is then oﬀered a composite
contract consisting of N∗ standard contracts with the speciﬁc parameters i∗, λ,a n d
x.
The standard contract structure provides a convenient basis for comparing con-
tracts with diﬀerent premium rates and triggers. Along with specifying the risk an
insurance company undertakes, it also gives the buyer an opportunity to determine
which contract provides the best coverage for the same price. The RMS loss measure
is a transparent selection criterion, which allows rank-ordering of various contracts
available on the market.
The composite contract does not necessarily need to consist of N∗ identical con-
tracts. In principle, one can combine contracts that diﬀer in structure. For instance,
we might consider a combination of contracts with diﬀerent triggers and limit pa-
rameters to obtain coverage over several risk layers simultaneously. However, ﬁnding
an optimal combination of multiple contracts of diﬀerent structures renders the opti-
mization problem more diﬃcult by increasing the number of variables to be chosen.
Alternatively, a more complicated contract may be ﬁrst constructed as a weighted av-
erage of several standard contracts of diﬀerent structure (in order to preserve the ﬁxed
premium rate and unit price) and then the composite contract may be constructed
according to (5).
Note that instead of ﬁnding an optimal number of contracts N∗, the problem may
also be reformulated in terms of the amount of money the buyer is prepared to pay
7for insurance. In this case, the number of contracts is ﬁxed, and the optimization
problem in (5) becomes a condition on only the parameters λ and π. While ﬁxing the
commitment of the buyer may not result in the best available risk hedging, such an
analysis may be important if buyer operates under tight budget constraints and can-
not aﬀord the best available insurance coverage. However, the pre-speciﬁed number
of contracts may not necessarily be optimal in the sense that the buyer sometimes
can achieve a greater risk reduction by actually reducing his commitment level.
Basis Risk
No matter how accurately the relation in (4) is estimated, there are ultimately
some risks that cannot be hedged against by using an index contract. In case of
crop production, harvest at a particular farm depends on a variety of factors, such as
the soil moisture at planting time, the amount of rainfall, the temperature patterns
during the growing season, and the amount of fertilizers in the soil. While one index,
e.g., amount of rainfall, may account for several risk factors, there is always some risk
attributed to other inﬂuential factors that are not correlated with the index. In other
words, unless the index exactly reﬂects the risk exposure of the buyer, there is always
some basis risk present. The latter may have several components, one caused by a
nondeterministic relation between the index and targeted variable (random shock ε
in (4)), as well as those caused by other factors.
The major issue in specifying the details of the contract is the trade-oﬀ between
transparency of the contract structure and amount of basis risk. More speciﬁcally,
there are three types of basis risk we need to be concerned about — temporal, spatial,
and crop-speciﬁc.
8Temporal Component
The sensitivity of yield to climatic conditions varies over the stages of growth. A
typical growth cycle can be divided into four phenological periods, viz. germination,
bloom, development, and maturity. Across the periods, weather parameters such
as rainfall, amount of sunshine, etc., have diﬀerent eﬀects on the prospective yield.
Too much rain during germination may slow down the overall plant growth, while
drought during the bloom and/or maturity may prevent crops from realizing their
full potential. Historical weather patterns are also diﬀerent during each period.
As an extreme case, one can create several diﬀerent contracts for each of the
phenological periods, and thus reduce the temporal basis risk to minimum. However
such an arrangement would involve added transaction costs for both sellers and buyers
(marketing, monitoring, etc.). Alternatively, an aggregate index may be created based
on amount of rainfall or sunshine during the whole growing season. The transaction
cost involved in marketing such a contract would be lower than for several distinct
contracts. However, the basis risk embodied by the single contract would be larger
and the index variable may be less transparent.
Spatial Component
Weather patterns diﬀer across locations within the same region. Measurements at
one station may track precipitation level or temperature at nearby farms very closely,
but diverge considerably from observations at farms located farther away. Thus, a
contract based on measurements at one station would bear very little basis risk for
some farmers, but perform very poorly for others. As before, an ideal solution to
the problem would be to create a separate contract for each station in the region.
However, this may result in dozens of distinct contracts marketed within a single
9crop producing district or even a county.
A more reasonable approach is either to choose a central (in some sense) station as
a reference point for the entire region, or create a weighted average of the observations
at diﬀerent stations. The latter may not necessarily be a more eﬃcient alternative,
since computing the average would require coordination of data collection from several
diﬀerent locations. In addition, the beginning of the growing season may vary slightly
from one part of the region to another. Therefore, the temporal component of the
basis risk may also be involved and further complicate the matter.
Crop-Speciﬁc Component
Diﬀerent crops vary in their sensitivity to rainfall, duration of the growing season,
and planting times. Obviously, a single contract cannot provide an optimal protection
for all crops. Therefore, either the contracts should be speciﬁcally tailored for each
crop, or a series of contracts should be developed for the whole season providing
diﬀerent levels of protection for diﬀerent periods within the season. Once again,
the crop-speciﬁc component of the basis risk may interact with temporal and spatial
components in a complex way.
Ultimately, the decision as to how much basis risk to sacriﬁce for contract trans-
parency is up to the insurance company issuing the contract and the buyer purchasing
it. An eﬃcient market will eventually ensure that only the contracts which provide
an optimal basis risk/transparency combination survive and trade actively.
Implementation Issues
The suggested methodology assumes that the index distribution h(i)a n dt h e
relation between the index and income g(  ι;ε) are known. In practice, however, only
particular realizations of   ι and   r are often available. In this case, the distribution of
10the index may be estimated by using either nonparametric techniques (e.g. kernel-
smoothing) or by ﬁtting the observed series by one of the standard distributions
(e.g. by the maximum likelihood method). The function g also has to be estimated
from the available data, with the appropriate functional form chosen based on either
agronomic or statistical considerations. Both estimations may present a challenge in
a practical situation.
Deriving the probability density function of the index is an easier task to handle,
since observations on weather patterns are available for most locations in the US
oftentimes for more than a hundred years (NCDC databases). For the rainfall, the
conventional assumption is to use the gamma-distribution (Martin, Barnett, and
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(DeGroot). The distribution accounts well for the stylized facts about rainfall pat-
terns such as nonnegativity, skewedness to the left, and possibility of events higher
than those observed historically (this would not be the case, for example, with beta-
distribution).
The relationship between yields and rainfall and/or other weather parameters
turns out to be more elusive. The agronomic literature generally suggests that the
relationship, if exists, is represented by a quadratic function of rainfall and possibly
temperature during the growth period. In particular, the models derived by Teigen
and Thomas (the most comprehensive study of the topic we found) for corn yields in
ten Midwestern states included linear, quadratic, and cross-product terms for both
precipitation and temperature for the months of May through September. The rele-
11vant independent variables were then selected for each state based on the regression
analysis.
While the models reported 90% and above goodness-of-ﬁt for most states, an
independent analysis of the NASS yield data series revealed that 50 to 70 percent of
the variation was explained by the liner trend variable included in all models. Since
the trend represents a systematic change in yields due to improved technologies and
agricultural practices, this is obviously not a risk component and thus does not need
to be hedged against. If the linear trend variable is removed from the models, the
goodness of ﬁt drops dramatically thus raising the question of model applicability.
Martin, Barnett, and Coble also adopt a quadratic model derived in an earlier
study based on observations of several test plots in Mississippi. However, they do
not provide actual data on yield realizations and how those are scattered around the
ﬁtted function.
Nevertheless, we attempted to implement a similar approach to establish a rela-
tionship between yield and weather variables for Iowa corn and Kansas wheat. In both
cases, a crop-producing district was selected randomly and then yields were regressed
against various combinations of weather variables (precipitation and temperature)
for each county in the district. The yields were detrended to account for technology
changes. The rainfall and temperature data were considered in two variants:abso-
lute monthly data and deviations from the long-term monthly averages (both types
of data available from NCDC). Unfortunately, the analysis failed to show consistent
patterns of relationships between yields and a speciﬁc set of variables. Even the visual
analysis of scatter diagrams of yields vs. rainfall and/or temperature showed little
or no systematic dependence, with high yields corresponding to both high and low
rainfall and or temperature and vice versa.
12The adjusted R2 rarely exceeded 30% for selected counties, and no single model
performed consistently well even in two adjacent counties. In addition, the models
often had to include such esoteric combinations of variables as the product of August
rainfall and temperature along with July rainfall squared but without any linear
terms. Clearly, such combinations can hardly suit as an index, which needs to have
a relatively simple structure transparent for both farmers and exchange brokers. In
addition, failure of any single index to performed uniformly well within the crop
producing district implies that each county would need its own contract based on its
own index. This again undermines the idea of simplicity and makes the contracts
much harder to market at an exchange or as an investment instrument.
Conclusion
Index insurance contracts may provide an alternative way to hedge the risk of
agricultural production. The contracts are more eﬃcient and may provide an access
to ﬁnancial resources usually unavailable to traditional insurance. The suggested
methodology allows one to design and price index insurance contracts based on ac-
tuarial requirements. It also allows a buyer to determine the optimal number of
contracts he needs to buy in order to obtain the best coverage.
However, in order to bring the methodology beyond purely academic exercise,
one needs to establish a relationship between the index and the risk being hedged
against. In the cases of Iowa corn and Kansas wheat, attempts to establish such
a relationship between yields and weather parameters did not produce consistent
results. Further analysis of crop/weather variable combinations may result in more
clear understanding of the contract applicability.
13Figure 1:Indemnity Payments of a Standard Contract
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